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Bundles, Big Deals, and the Copyright Wars:
What Can Academic Libraries Learn from the
Record Industry Crash?
EDWARD KEANE
Brooklyn Campus, Long Island University, Brooklyn, New York, USA

This article reviews the contention that U.S. laws favor copyright
owners over consumers, and pre-existing models over innovation.
The relationship of commercial publishers to the Open Access movement is compared to that of the creators/users of file sharers and
the Record Industry. The library literature bears out the contention
that journal publishers have exhibited some of the behaviors that
contributed to the decline of the major record labels. Librarians
who support free scholarship will find the music industry plight
instructive; just as iTunes fulfilled consumer demand, Open Access
and other alternatives will transform publishing.
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INTRODUCTION
A brief review of copyright history leaves one to conclude that rights holders’
interests, regardless of format, have been incrementally expanded to unfair
proportions. It is in this context that the music industry and other commercial purveyors have conducted business. Large academic journal publishers,
it turns out, have treated a part of their customer base, academic libraries,
in much the same way as the labels responded to the preferences of music
consumers, namely, ignoring them. Although listening to and purchasing
digitally downloaded music has evolved into a convenient, relatively affordable form of entertainment that takes up a fair amount of our leisure time
and money, there was a prolonged phase of conflict among various business
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and consumer interests that had to be resolved before the current business
model took off. Many of these conflicts were the inevitable result of innovation, as painful for the music industry as they were for newspapers, book
publishers, and librarians. When first confronted with the perceived threat
of file sharing, the music industry relied on the copyright laws of the United
States to protect their preferred way to sell music in a bundled format, the
CD, and then relied on intimidation of consumers by suing and threatening
to sue individuals. To the casual observer it would seem the music industry
prevailed, but in fact it lost out on millions by not working with peer-topeer aggregators such as Napster when a compromise was offered years
before Steve Jobs’ timely introduction of iTunes to a suddenly receptive and
desperate industry.
The yearly cost increases for online publisher “bundles” of journal content is well documented. Many librarians and other faculty members are now
questioning publishers’ business models, with some advocating increased
flexibility in agreements and far tougher negotiating tactics. Publishers have
responded to the criticism by establishing increased availability to Open
Access titles and offering some flexibility in their models. However, the
majority of informed librarians who work with serials would probably reflect
that publishers have a long way to go to accommodate customer needs, just
as many music consumers at one time balked at using the first commercial
music digital downloading services. With some exceptions, libraries have
been inclined so far to ask their institutions for more money to pay for publisher packages rather than walk away. Likewise, most scholars on tenure
track are unlikely to quibble about details of a commercial copyright license
that is actually limiting the impact of their research over the long term. These
are the kind of issues that librarians are in a position to educate their faculty colleagues about, as are the alternative business models and improved
accessibility that Open Access offers. Some readers may find that it is a bit
of a stretch to say that Open Access is to commercial journal publishers
what Napster was to Warner Brothers, but there are some interesting parallels. Over time, cash-strapped libraries and the commercial publishers may
be compelled to compromise on something akin to the iTunes model for
music downloads—imperfect, yes, but infinitely fairer to the customer than
the preceding industry model.

WHO BENEFITS MOST FROM COPYRIGHT LAW?
An example of how pervasive Digital Rights Management has become
is the agreement Microsoft users are required to “sign” before using
Windows Media Player which allows Microsoft to delete unauthorized
content from one’s computer.
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The crux of the copyright debate in the Western world was summarized in
an 1841 address to the British Parliament. Lord Thomas Macaulay contended
that extending copyright terms and taxing someone for repeatedly using
a copyrighted work was not in the public interest, but rather “a tax on
readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.” Macaulay expressed
fear that by extending copyright terms Parliament was inadvertently helping
to monopolize thought and that future generations would come to view
the licensing of ideas as inalienable.1 The Parliamentary debate of the 19th
century, as to whether copyright is an inherent right that should be protected
and periodically extended by the state, or should be limited by terms that
do not exceed human mortality and protect innovation, remains the essence
of the contemporary debate.
The U.S. Constitution is unambiguous when it comes to copyright: The
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.2 Since 1790 copyright terms
have steadily increased in the Untied States while successful judicial victories in favor of “readers” have been modest and infrequent. For example,
in Supreme Court cases like Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. (1984)3 and Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company
(1991)4 the court affirmed the rights of those who backed innovative technology and used published work without permission. In Sony the court ruled
that the owners of VCRs did not violate copyright law when they taped free
television broadcasts. Despite the best efforts by the film industry in the
early 1980s, and in particular the over-the-top Congressional testimony of
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) President Jack Valenti,
that “the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as
the Boston Strangler is to the woman home alone,” the court protected the
new technology against claims of infringement.5 Some saw the suit brought
by Universal studios against Sony, maker of the VCR, as nothing more than
an attempt by one industry to stifle a competitive threat from another and
avoid the lost revenue.6
The particulars of the Fiest case involved the expense and time it took
to compile and publish a list of customer contact information derived from
another published source, with the court ruling that the original work was
not protected because directories, databases, and so on do not reach a
threshold of creative originality worthy of copyright protection.7 For those
who felt American copyright law in 1984 were too restrictive, the Fiest ruling
was a minor victory. Like the Sony case, Fiest gave opponents of restrictive
copyright false hope that other similar rulings were on the way and would
signal a judicial and legislative trend.
To protect the interests of copyright holders in the digital age, political
and business forces mobilized, closed ranks, and tightened U.S. copyright law further in 1998. Congress introduced and passed two copyright
laws that codified what opponents believed advanced an anti-consumer,
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anti-innovation agenda, generally reinforcing the interests of large corporations holding the rights to intellectual and creative property. Also known
by turns as the Sonny Bono Act and the Mickey Mouse Protection Act—
because the law affirmed that Disney would not lose their mascot to the
public domain—the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) increased the
term of copyright, and protected work for the life of the author plus 70
years, or 50 additional years from the last time the terms were adjusted in
1976. Corporate authorship rights, also called Work For Hire, were extended
to 120 years after creation, or 95 years after publication, whichever comes
first. Copyright protection for works published prior to January 1, 1978, was
extended by 20 years.8
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios stood more or less unchallenged
until a group of twenty-eight Hollywood studios and major record labels,
led by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studios, took Grokster, Streamcast, Kazaa and
other entities to U.S. District Court and the Court of Appeals for marketing
file sharing software and both courts held for the defendants. The entertainment companies then took their case to the Supreme Court, where, in
a unanimous decision, the court established a test for distributors of file
sharing software which required intent to advertise or induce use in order
to prove infringement. The ruling essentially made the distributors rather
than the developers responsible for sharing files.9 The constitutionality of
CTEA was challenged in Eldred v Ashcroft but once again the law was
upheld by the Supreme Court. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice
Stephen Breyer echoed Lord Macaulay’s 1841 speech when he maintained
that the CTEA essentially bestowed perpetual copyright that undermined
public interests. Breyer’s dissent also served to underscore the absurdity of
retroactively extending copyright by pointing out that it was highly unlikely
someone would be motivated to produce work so their great-grandchildren
could receive royalties.10
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), signed into law in 1998
by President Bill Clinton, criminalized any attempt to circumvent Digital
Rights Management (DRM) technology. An example of how pervasive DRM
has become is the agreement Microsoft users are required to “sign” before
using Windows Media Player, which allows Microsoft to delete unauthorized content from one’s computer.11 As a result of the DMCA it is a crime in
America for someone to reconfigure a DRM (such as programming a DVD
player to work with otherwise incompatible discs) and share the source
code, even before there has been any actual copyright violation. In 2001, the
DMCA was challenged when a computer programmer reverse-engineered a
DVD so the encryption algorithm could be made available for free on the
Internet. The MPAA sent out cease and desist letters to selected offenders, some of whom complied, but the movie studios targeted the editor of
The Hacker Quartely, Eric Corley, and two others who maintained links
to websites where the digital lock-picking tool was still available. After

Bundles, Big Deals, and the Copyright Wars

37

a preliminary injunction, the U.S. District and the U.S. Court of Appeals
upheld the injunction. The district court noted that the defendants’ primary
purpose was to promote redistribution of DVDs in violation of copyright
laws. However neither court ruled on the First Amendment merits but on
the “confrontational” strategy of the defendants.12
Yu-Lin Chang wrote that DRM’s not only were an attempt by the entertainment industry to avoid being held accountable to the narrow amount of
copyright law that reined them in, but they “seem to make it possible to grant
information industries a new access right out of the traditional exclusive
rights of copyright holders.”13 The DMCA-blessed authentication processes,
intentionally or not, gave some large companies the legal right to control
creative and intellectual content at the expense of the Constitution’s clause
promoting progress in the sciences and useful arts. Chang predicted that the
technological flaws in DRMs and the inevitable circumvention by hackers
would prevent the entertainment and information industries from ever seeing a world where copyright is trumped by proprietary technology.14 Indeed,
legality aside, there is almost always a way to access copyrighted films, TV
shows, music, and scholarly content on the Internet. The negative impact
of the aforementioned laws and the judicial decisions that upheld them, not
to mention the near-unanimous support they received in Congress following intensive lobbying by the entertainment and publishing industries, could
lead one to conclude that a full realization of the collective damage of the
aforementioned laws and judicial ruling was lost on the average American
and most politicians. However, there are any number of groups and individuals disappointed with the copyright laws in the United States professional
organizations (e.g., the American Library Association has a standing committee on intellectual property rights and advocate policies that one day could
be part of a successful reform movement). Reformers have participated in
activities that have ranged from legal scholars making the written case for
the laws to be amended to hackers redistributing newly released commercial
blockbuster films on the Internet.
The copyright laws of the late 1990s could ultimately alienate consumers of household digital devices too. Quaedvlieg states that “Digitization
and mass use are changing the nature of copyright: originally a property
right focused on protecting work from being copied ... it has developed
into the weighing of interests. The citizen now encounters the copyright
law and its restrictions in his own living-room: citizens’ acceptance on
limitations in this sphere will be very low.”15 A legislative push-back on
copyright was needed, some scholars contended, but others, like Robert
Merges, noted that private individuals and companies added content to
the public domain, albeit for dubious motives. Biotechnology firms, for
instance, invested millions of dollars with the respective goals of publishing information like gene sequences and pre-empting competitors who
developed the same sequences from claiming infringement. Motive aside,
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Merges maintained that this dynamic had the unintended consequence of
providing users with free content they otherwise would not be able to
use, and cited projects like the Creative Commons as an organized effort
that provides alternatives to traditional property right models. These private
investments and public domain initiatives revealed a “self-correcting feature”
and demonstrated that congressional legislation is not the only recourse
through which the “excesses of intellectual property may be addressed.”16
Lawrence Lessing’s theory of “code is law” portrayed an Internet
increasingly controlled by computer programs, less the ideal of an open
democratic medium and more a nexus of commerce supported by government legislation. Code writers who enforce DRM for Apple and Microsoft
are writing Internet law, regardless of what has been or will be enacted by
Congress.17
Whether an age of “information totalitarianism” is coming, or already
exists, depends on who one asks. But it is fair to say that DRMs have given
the MPAA, the Recording Institute Association of America (RIAA), and huge
entertainment companies control over the fastest growing markets in an
unregulated environment. Imagine an academic environment where most or
all textbooks a library puts on reserve are only available in digital format
and locked down by a DRM, circumventing fair use. Although it is fair to
say that the invention of the Xerox copy machine caused as much outrage
as the invention of the VCR, the high-speed tape dubbing machine, and LPs,
those technologies still allowed educators and librarians to assess the risk of
using them under the concept of fair use. DRM, by contrast, renders such
assessment moot.
And from the point of view of academic librarians who have been
writing about and designing access services for the 21st-century library, the
DRMs not only block access but infringe on copyright clauses that are meant
to protect the rights of libraries and their users.18
Since the late nineties when copyright owners succeeded in obtaining virtually everything they asked for from Congress related to extending
terms, and the record companies sued Napster, then upped the ante by
suing individual consumers, the give and take between Lord Macaulay’s
aforementioned “readers and writers” has decidedly favored the writers.

BAD BUSINESS MODELS IN THE MUSIC BIZ
After having the courts, the legislature and the executive branches emphatically enact and then re-affirm CTEA and the DCMA, and after winning just
about every lawsuit they filed, effectively bankrupting Napster, it could be
asked why the record industry was viewed as the big loser in the digital
music revolution. Some observers and advocates have gone so far as to argue
that Congress, knowingly or not, has created a bad Business Model that they
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dumped on consumers and that has turned out to be a perpetual bonanza for
copyright holders. Despite this, how did such a one-sided, heavily regulated
copyright environment come to prevail in the United States?
William Patry argued that the copyright industries have engaged in
“moral panics,” and explained that the imbalance came about because,
“...bad business models, failed economic ideologies, and the acceptance of
skewed metaphors have led to an unjustified expansion of our copyright
laws.”19
While the phrase appeared with some scholarly notoriety in Stanley
Cohen’s study of England’s Mods and Rockers’ street conflicts of the midsixties, “moral panic” was a type of hysteria that also characterized the
Salem Witch trials, the comic book scare of the 1950s and McCarthyism.
“Panic” in this context was not characterized by an actual frenzy nor did
it deny the subject of the panic was real, but rather presented an existing
problem of manageable proportions and turned it into an existential one to
further a political agenda. Patry elaborated, “...debates rarely focus on the
only relevant question: Will the proposal actually serve the public good by
promoting learning? Instead, debates degenerate into name calling and the
copyright equivalent of the sky is falling.” The tactic was political and was
used to advance “undeserving economic interests” under a pretense of moral
imperatives. Citing Jack Valenti’s comments before Congress as one of many
examples, Patry noted that the unrelenting use of over-the-top metaphoric
language—terminology like pirates, thieves, parasites, trespassers—was the
manifestation of a false appeal, or moral panic, and portraying one’s opponents with this kind of language was tantamount to turning them into “folk
devils,” portraying them as deviants because they threatened the status quo.
This fear served the copyright industries well.20 This coordinated and effective campaign, combined with strategies like the music industry’s use of
lawsuits to sue its presumptive former consumers for file sharing, was a significant, prominent, and telling characteristic of a particularly bad business
model which, in the end, did not serve the interests of its architects.
In 1948, the Supreme Court ruled, in U.S. v Paramount Studios, that
movie studios could not bundle their films to the theaters that screened
them. The studios, like music labels who sold albums with erratic content,
and eventually academic journal publishers and aggregators who bundle
lightly used titles with more essential ones, had been forcing their customers
to exhibit substandard works lest they lose the rights to show the more
acclaimed and popular films.21
Thousands of albums across all musical genres have turned out to be
universally loved and recognized works of art, but over time the format has
proven to be a less popular option among music consumers who are offered
a choice. By the time Napster was established the music industry was not
providing its customers with what they wanted. The history basically reveals
that the labels were the last concerned party to understand it.

40

E. Keane

It was this refusal to let go of the CD that cost the record industry time
and new business, and, by 2003, managed to thoroughly anger, alienate,
and frustrate consumers. According to industry figures, from the early 1970s
through the late 1980s the total number of albums (in all formats) shipped
each year in the United States hovered around 650 million. In 1992, CD
sales reached 400 million; six years later they hit 800 million. By 2000, more
than 900 million CDs were being shipped each year. Many of those were
back-catalog purchases, as music fans converted to the format (CDs) that
seemed destined to make all others extinct. The easy profits that the major
labels reaped from CD sales in the 1990s created a collective state of denial
even though a small, vocal group of music company insiders warned that
the model should be changed.22
The labels could have avoided the crash of the past decade and cashed
in on the digital tide if, in 2000, they had struck a licensing deal with
Napster instead of shutting it down through a lawsuit. In 2002, bowing to
the inevitable, the majors aligned behind two corporate allies in the digital subscription services industry, Musicnet (EMI, BMG, Time Warner) and
Pressplay (Universal Music Group and SONY). It was soon apparent though
that consumers were dissatisfied with a model that limited them to roughly
half the music they wanted. In order to have access to all their favorite tunes,
consumers would have to pay separate subscription fees for two services.23
TheWall Street Journal noted, “The commercial music services are following
a tough act: the free file-sharing Napster service and successors like Kazaa
and Morpheus, which get their vast song selections from users who share
the tunes, not the labels. The file-sharing networks don’t have everything—
there are a lot more hip-hop fans than classical addicts serving up their
collections, judging by their selection of tunes—but they come close.”24 In
Appetite for Self-Destruction: The Spectacular Crash of the Record Industry
in the Digital Age, Steve Knopper maintained that the failure of the major
labels to strike a deal with Napster was “the last chance” for the industry
to avoid an economic collapse. The top executives were so preoccupied
with the moral rhetoric and with suing individual file sharers that they were
unable to act quickly enough to create what could have been a sustainable
business model. After the industry’s aggressive litigation subdued rampant
illegal file sharing, some music industry insiders figured, CD sales would
once again be the primary format for sales. After they had hitched their collective wagon to the CD format, there was substantial proof in the Napster
case that Musicnet and Pressplay were actually designed to try and stave
off the inevitable digital tide, rather than created to meet the needs of the
industry’s customers.25
The recording industry realized that although peer to peer (P2P) file
sharing via Napster was shut down through litigation (Napster declared
bankruptcy in 2002) the saga changed the consumer music business model
thereafter. The corporations that had acquired or merged with the record
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labels in the  80s and  90s focused on short-term financial windfalls, even
as it become apparent that the reasons—control, convenience, durability,
flexibility—for purchasing music on CDs were greatly enhanced once the
online model was ubiquitious.26
Another area of frustration for anyone who has ever decided to replace
a video with a DVD, a vinyl LP with a CD, or a CD with a digital album
download is paying for the same product over multiple formats. To an
extent, this dynamic boomeranged back on the entertainment industries and
their accusation that P2P software users were pirates, thieves, plunderers,
parasites, and so on. It is worth noting the irony when large entertainment
companies are painted as parasitic. The big music companies’ longstanding expectation of perpetually cashing in on a business model of the full
album CD even after it was clearly no longer sustainable lends credence
to Patry’s charge that some rights holders were essentially “undeserving
economic interests.”
There is growing recognition that technology, innovation, and the
democratic nature of the Internet are responsible for whatever measure of
positive change has taken place in academic publishing manifesting as the
Open Access (OA) movement and institutional repositories (IRs). More flexible copyright agreements are one result of this situation as some creators
of music and of scholarly research are challenging their partners to work
with them to find a balance between reciprocity and innovation. For example, the alternative rock band The Offspring limited the number songs from
their album, Conspiracy of One, that were offered freely on the Web after
their label complained when all the selections were available. Beside the
obvious desire to protect their interests, the recording industry believed that
sanctioning any free downloads would jeopardize pending litigation against
their own consumer base.27
Even though the big record companies chased Napster from the market, the company might have the last laugh. The U.S. Department of Justice
investigated charges that Musicnet and Pressplay were specifically designed
to impede the digital music market on the Internet. Although the investigation was terminated with no charges filed after two years a venture capital
firm filed suit in 2006 claiming the big labels formed the flawed, limited services named Musicnet and Pressplay, with the ulterior motive of driving the
music-buying public back to the bundled content of the CD. When the music
industry finally turned to Apple for help with their failed business model
Steve Jobs told a Warner Brothers executive, as if speaking for all frustrated
music fans, that the major labels were trying to corner the digital music market and the consumer deserved better. Jobs’ insistence that songs be priced
no higher than 70 cents was met with minimal resistance in the industry
cohort given the financial beating they took before negotiating with Jobs.
But before Jobs became involved, accessing digital music seamlessly was

42

E. Keane

unrealized due to pre-existing contracts with individual artists and publisher
agreements.28

BUNDLES, BAD BUSINESS MODELS, AND THE BIG DEAL:
SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING
Historically, once copyright holders become hostile toward their consumers and initiate lawsuits the relationship is all but irreparable, and
the resulting perception is that consumers’ desires take a back seat to
the industry’s fears of cannibalizing their traditional market.

Although it is fair to say that the invention of the Xerox copy machine
caused as much outrage as the invention of the VCR, the high-speed tape
dubbing machine, and LPs, those technologies still allowed educators
and librarians to assess the risk of using them under the concept of fair
use. Digital Rights Management mechanisms, by contrast, render such
assessments moot.
The founder of the Internet Archive, Brewster Kahle, publicly pondered
whether the strategy used by the as the music industry to protect their digital
content might be used more frequently by academic publishers. Addressing
the specifics of a lawsuit brought against Georgia State University by several
publishers Kahle stated, “I wonder if this will turn out to be ‘an attack the
innovator’ suit like the peer-to-peer suits for the music industry.”29
When the global financial crisis hit in late 2008, there were severe cuts
in academic libraries and serials budgets were reduced anywhere from 3 to
30%.30 Since the late 1990s, when publishers began offering almost all of
their journal collection online with a pricing structure based on a library’s
print subscriptions and an additional e-access fee for the added content,
librarians have used the term “Big Deal” to describe the business model.
Ester Hoorn defined the library’s predicament as a combination of upwardly
spiraling prices for the journal subscriptions set by the publishers and a
downwardly spiraling number of subscriptions by the academic libraries.
This dynamic has threatened the accessibility to academic information.31
Libraries that signed their first Big Deal contract with Elsevier around
1999 and continued to renew the agreement with the company’s standard
annual price increase paid 80% more in 2009. And libraries that signed five
year contracts with that particular publisher would essentially be paying
almost twice as much as they paid for the Big Deal in 1999. Despite the
recession, Elsevier and Springer increased 2009 subscription rates by an
average of 5% for 2010.32
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Like music consumers who were unhappy with their choices in 2002,
librarians became unhappy with the Big Deal. In their 2009 study, “Building
Relevant and Sustainable Collections” Nicole Mitchell and Elizabeth Lorbeer
stated: “With endowment investments and state tax revenue at low levels, both private and public institutions are no longer able to support their
libraries’ excessive spending on content. Purchasing large bundles of content is no longer thrifty and the notion that someone will need it at some
time in the future can arguably be considered wasteful spending; the ‘Big
Deal’ is no longer a good deal.”33
Tellingly, several society publishers have frozen rates or decreased them
in the last two years in deference to the recession. Indeed, it is often the
independently marketed journals, reasonably priced society titles, and competing start-ups that suffer when librarians review their titles in light of
inadequate budgets and yet find themselves contractually or consortially
bound to the Big Deal agreements.34
The Serials Librarian devoted a special 2009 section to libraries and the
budget crisis, including implications for their Big Deals. The editor noted
that some of the papers submitted to the journal on ending their Big Deal
commitments were written before the meltdown of 2008, underscoring the
long-term frustration and dissatisfaction librarians have had with this business model.35 The trend of libraries to modify or eschew the Big Deal has
been similar to music fans giving a collective thumbs down to a buying
option that forced one to purchase buy a CD’s-worth of tunes when they
only wanted one song.
One recent survey that gauged the likelihood of librarians walking away
from existing Big Deal agreements found that over 80% of the respondents were committed to at least one such commitment.36 Curiously, the
researchers found that librarians viewed the Big Deal as both a motivator to
save money and an inhibitor to spend money, meaning that some libraries
had looked at the issue closely and found it was not cost effective or, as is
the case at many small and mid-sized schools, the Big Deal was more cost
effective for a small serials staff who found it difficult to make collections
decisions on a title-by-title, discipline-by-discipline basis.
Queried between December 2007 and January 2008 as to how they
would deal with a flat or shrinking materials budget (a prescient question
one month before the recession hit) 68% of librarians said they would cancel
titles from their Big Deals and try to renegotiate with their publishers. Many
librarians in this study reported that their institutions would not be able to
endure static or reduced budgets given the cost of their Big Deals, and 77%
said they felt compelled to accept titles in order to get what they still felt
was a good deal.37
A 2009 UK survey of libraries that subscribed to at least one consortiabrokered Big Deal found that the main reason for subscribing was that Big
Deal collections were “easier to administer” than traditional collection cherry
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picking or subject clustering.38 Anyone who has had to administer a journal
collection at a small or mid-sized university will understand the reasons for
the popularity of this answer. (At Long Island University, where the library
budget has been static for the last three years and the author is employed as
the Acting Periodicals Librarian at the Brooklyn center, for instance, librarians
of the respective campuses are currently debating whether or not to renew
a large publisher package for 2010–2011).
A number of the answers to this particular survey were indicative of the
way that music consumers were (a) unhappy and (b) waiting for the business
model to change. For instance, the most popular answer to the question,
“What changes in Big Deal offerings would make them more attractive to
you?” was a “pricing model which makes it affordable to move to e-only,”
and the second most popular was a “pricing model NOT based on historical
print spend(ing).”39
The most popular answer was reminiscent of the music customer of
eight years ago who said, “let me throw out my LPs and CDs and start
downloading music.” The next answer, “pricing model not base on historical
print” was just like the music customer who said, “Please, I only want one
or two songs, don’t charge me for the whole album!”
Overall, the survey found that more respondents (45%), were “less
happy” with their Big Deal than when they initially signed the deal. In
light of the upcoming subscription increases, the majority of respondents
reported the option they were most likely to exercise was to ask their universities for more money. Revealingly, and no less grim, was the next most
popular option, “cut the book budget,” which of course, for many librarians,
is a common reality.

THE LONG GOODBYE: CDs AND THE BIG DEAL
It is often the independently marketed journals, reasonably priced society titles and competing start-ups that suffer when librarians review their
titles in light of inadequate budgets and yet find themselves contractually
or consortially bound to the Big Deal agreements.

The state of the library market for commercial journals today, with librarians
weighing whether OA is a viable alternative to the Big Deal, or wondering
whether they will continue to subscribe to their Big Deals at all, is similar to
the situation of the music industry when Napster and its users turned away
from the Musicnet/Pressplay model.
In comparing the commercial publishing and commercial music services
it is true that the latter was changed when its customers—loyal and devoted
though they were to the music—collectively announced they could survive
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without digital downloads, and found other ways to hear music. It’s worth
remembering that it was well after people were using peer-to-peer software
to share singles, clearly consumer’s overwhelming preference, before the
record industry finally adjusted its own business model. The industry’s initial
reaction was to steer consumers to their stale business plan, meaning albums
on CD, instead of individual songs.
Consumers were cheated not just by the lack of choice, but also the
selective nature of what was made available during this period. As the legal
columnist for Billboard stated:
Pressplay and MusicNet launched in 2002 as the labels’ answer to free
and illegal downloads. But both quickly foundered as victims of high prices,
poor design, and meager offerings that included music by major acts such
as U2 and Counting Crows, but not necessarily the tracks users wanted.40
Large commercial journal publishers have not foundered like the music
industry, but the complaints about the business model have been fairly consistent since 1999. Librarians have wondered in the professional literature,
at conferences, and to the publishers about alternative ways of providing
research/scholarly content. Unlike music fans, however, there has not been
an organized boycott.
So, what is the viable option that comes to mind first, in light of a discussion about the merits of the Big Deal versus the positives of unbundling
publisher packages? Theodore Bergstrom concluded, “if articles were purchased directly by users, demand for journal articles would be much more
price elastic than the demand of libraries for subscriptions to bundled
journals.”41 The current situation allows publishers to ensure the Pay Per
View (PPV) model is not seized upon by libraries by keeping the cost per
article around $25–$30, too much for most institutions, but cheap enough to
offer users as a last-resort for emergency access when interlibrary loan is not
an option.42 Unlike the consumers who accurately evaluated Pressplay and
Musicnet, librarians have not walked away from the Big Deal. But if they
did, it is likely the cost of pay-per-view content would come down because,
like the iTunes model, publishers would have a real interest in possessing a
loyal base of repeat customers who would prefer to get their songs for free,
but could live with and use a product that is fairly priced.
Like the music consumers who found, almost immediately, that they
preferred micro-choosing songs instead of buying albums on CDs or being
forced to download bundles of songs to get the one or two they really
wanted, Michael Hanson and Terese Heidenwolf concluded that significant
numbers of journal titles chosen by subject selectors from within and outside
the library were not necessarily being used at their institution. Armed with
such usage data they felt confident when they implemented the PPV model
at Lafayette College.43
Similar to the “second tier” songs offered by Pressplay and Musicnet,
the big publishers sometimes bundle hundred of titles with little relevance
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to a school’s curriculum in the packages sold with high impact titles. This
approach helped to inspire a mass consumer correction, manifested in the
academic library world via the OA and IR models.
The most teachable part of the Musicnet/Pressplay episode was that
the labels could have avoided their industry’s meltdown of 2003 if instead
of targeting file sharers, their own customers, with lawsuits had they struck
a licensing deal with Napster in 2000.
In 2000, the major record labels received an offer from Napster that
would have split the profits evenly for legally downloaded content from
Napster, but the labels refused. Beyond the obvious short fall in the proposal from the labels’ point of view, there was conjecture that the real issue
was the inherently incompatible phenomenon of innovation versus existing
markets. This friction was played out and continues to be played out in any
number of industries, including academic publishing, where innovations like
OA and the Creative Commons have caught the attention of some librarians
and commercial publishers.
It remains to be seen if the commercial journal publishers will respond
to the demands of their consumers and offer greater flexibility in the pricing
and bundling of their collections. However in at least one well-documented
instance, one publisher decided it was better to tweak the Big Deal business
model and work with an institution to keep their patronage and still return
a profit-just not as big as previously.
For some time now, librarians have had alternatives to the value-added
model of the Big Deal packages but have been hesitant to act due to the
convenience of OA and faculty satisfaction. The well-publicized story of
Cornell University’s 2003 decision to walk away from their online Elsevier
ScienceDirect subscription because of the bundling of unused, expensive
titles demonstrates the validity of Bergstrom’s maxim: that if you are going
to bargain you must be prepared to walk.44 Cornell deputy university
librarian Ross Atkinson said, “This was not so much a strong ideological
stand; business-wise, bundling [just] didn’t work out.” Atkinson emphasized
that when libraries walk away from a major multi-year bundled commitment they gain more control over their collection decisions and are able
to respond annually to budget upheavals and cut titles when necessary
without penalty.45 Like the negotiated business agreement that ultimately
proved mutually beneficial to Sony, Universal, BMG, and iTunes, Elsevier
was able to work with Cornell and modify its business model. By December
2003, it was reported that Elsevier disputed media accounts that Cornell
University, Harvard University, and the Universities of California systems
were dropping large numbers of their titles. The company claimed they
had productive negotiations with the aforementioned schools, indicating to
longtime observers of this market that in this particular instance Elsevier was
listening to its customers.46 By early 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported
that Cornell, which had been spending 20% of its serials budget on 2% of
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its titles in ScienceDirect, subscribed to a modified, unbundled package that
reportedly eliminated about 150 journal subscriptions.47 One indication that
the current incarnation of the Big Deal has been successfully challenged,
was a statement that appeared on Elsevier’s corporate website under the
heading, Elsevier’s position on universal access and open access: “We are not
attached to any single business model or publishing mechanism. We believe
a mix is the best way to meet the needs of all stakeholders.” However, under
the heading “Sustainability,” on the same corporate Web page, this statement
appears: “Through these so-called ‘Big Deals’ libraries can license access to
previously unsubscribed titles at a fraction of the list price.” Today Elsevier
offers users the PPV option through ArticleChoice, a hybrid model because,
“Articles can be purchased in bundles (100, 200, and 500).”48 This option
was a welcome response to consumer demand and Elsevier’s efforts should
be commended,but the pricing model remains problematic;the approach is
a variation of the phase in music consumerism when songs were available
for downloading but the companies still wanted to bundle whole albums or
restrict access to some content. As the iTunes business model has demonstrated, low prices yielding to consumer demand, and profits need not be
mutually exclusive. Michael Beaudouin-Laron pointed out the problems that
the OA author-pays model presents to any institution asked to fund faculty
research. He revealed that at the conservative price of $2,500 per article X
100 published pieces, a hypothetical school would have to budget $250,000
to support scholarship and research—a figure beyond the financial means
of most institutions of higher education. Like others, Beaudouin-Laron is a
fan of iTunes and recommended 99 cent downloads of scholarly articles.49
The record industry advanced the idea that copyright violation was
obliterating profits when it was promoting an inferior product that offered
one or two quality songs for the price of 11 or 12. Scholarly journal publishers have been reluctant to make it convenient for librarians to unbundle
publisher packages for fear of losing the most productive golden goose they
have. By the time iTunes came around, the major labels had no choice
but to adjust their business model or go completely out of business. The
academic journal trade is suffused now with animus among librarians and
informed faculty. For their part, journal publishers will not unbundle their
Big Deals and offer individual articles or titles at a reasonable price until
libraries strategize and prepare back-up plans.
In 2008, when Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and
Sage Publications sued four university officials at Georgia State University in
U.S. District Court asserting “systematic, widespread and unauthorized copying and distribution of a vast amount of copyrighted works,” through the
university’s website, the New York Times made a direct comparison between
text books and CDs: “The dispute recalls problems the music industry had
in protecting the format of an album on a CD,” the Times quoted visiting
Yale law professor Susan P. Crawford, who pointed out the win–win nature

48

E. Keane

of unbundling the content: “What publishers don’t understand is they could
disaggregate. They could electronically rip apart their books and sell them
chapter by chapter, and everyone would be happier.”50 Historically, once
copyright holders become hostile toward their consumers and initiate lawsuits the relationship is all but irreparable, and the resulting perception is
that consumers’ desires take a back seat to the industry’s fears of cannibalizing their traditional market.51 The publishers in the Georgia State case would
not “rip apart” their content and offer it piecemeal as their customers wanted
until they were convinced that the innovation would be at least as beneficial
to them as it is to their customers.
It is important to note that whether a library will benefit from dropping a
publisher package depends on the way a bundle of journal matches an institution’s needs. Tim Bucknall’s comparative study of three models—direct
subscription, the Big Deal, and pay-per-view—indicated that PPV was costeffective when compared to the direct subscription model, but ultimately not
sustainable; Bucknall found that the additional vendor platforms required to
accommodate added titles and related aggregate expenses were prohibitive.
After signing Big Deal agreements with Springer, Blackwell, and Wiley and
then analyzing the usage data from their platforms Bucknall found the Big
Deal was more cost effective than PPV because there was a higher usage for
bundled, added value titles, than for subscribed titles. He also reported that
once UNCG signed on for Springer, Blackwell, and Wiley’s Big Deal, PPV
usage dropped by 75%.52 Librarians considering moving towards or away
from online publisher packages might consider reviewing the usage metrics in “A comparative evaluation of journal literature access options at the
University of North Carolina at Greensboro.” Based on Bucknall’s findings
at UNGC, the decision to stick with the publishers’ Big Deals was obvious.
However, it should be noted that the author’s conclusions cannot be applied
to all other libraries since usage data of non-subscribed content is likely to
vary from school to school.53 When curricular and research needs at other
institutions do not match up with the added-value content in a bundled
package usage statistics are not likely to be high.
Big music companies have become the target of an ongoing class action
suit, which, so far, the federal judiciary has allowed to go forward. The litigants claim that the labels colluded against online music aggregators that
would not consent to their rigid licensing terms. The labels wanted to control
which artist and songs were available online, and also wanted to base pricing
on consumer demand. Meanwhile, three economists researching academic
journal publishing filed a Freedom of Information Act, in 2009, in order
to collect copies of Big Deal contracts from libraries in order to report on
what they suspected would be differences in the amounts universities are
charged for their Big Deals. A preliminary review of the contracts led them
to report, “hard bargaining has saved a lot of money for some libraries. If
you fail to reach a Big Deal bargain, the result is not a catastrophe.” The
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author of the article reported that one publisher, Elsevier, took offense and
in a tactic reminiscent of the music companies’ strategy, namely litigation,
sued Washington State University to prevent them from being released from
the contract, but lost the case.54 Suing one’s customers, it turns out, allows
the copyright holders to temporarily halt innovation and protect their business model. Aggregators and publishers sold libraries unwieldy collections
with significant title overlap, reminiscent of music companies that repeatedly
cashed in on the same content in different formats.
Bergstrom argued that librarians are at a disadvantage because they
“are not likely to know as much about what their scholar-clients need to
read as the scholars themselves.”55 Neither librarians, scholars who request
subscriptions, nor the school administrators can make sound, effective,
informed decisions about the Big Deal model, which, unlike a pay-for-view
model, is not susceptible to the vagaries of supply and demand. Elsevier
and Springer, as opposed to some society publishers, continued to hike
their subscription prices even as the recession of 2008 and the devastating effects on libraries dragged on into 2011. Threatening to cancel a Big
Deal licensing agreement will not move such corporations to compromise.
In such an environment, how does the academic serials librarian remain relevant? Since there often is no reason for researchers to physically go to the
library, university administrators have asked and will continue to ask, fairly,
whether librarians have a useful role to play in acquiring online journal
content. Librarians should have empirical studies at-the-ready that support
the case they need to continue to take the lead in serials acquisition, and
have a concise set of convincing bullet points highlighting a reasonably
strong and informed knowledge of the business of academic publishing as
well as the subject and content expertise in which they have traditionally
excelled. Like record companies executives in the middle of the last decade,
librarians will be asked to justify their role in the acquisition of scholarly
articles as online autonomy beyond the library becomes the preferred user
experience.

OPEN ACCESS: BEYOND THE IDEAL
The serials crisis motivated some librarians, publishers and authors to participate in the OA movement. All of the major commercial publishers have
reacted to the OA movement by offering some content on the Web for
free. By 2011, being published in a peer reviewed OA journal had become
a viable option for scholars, even for junior faculty on tenure track under
pressure to publish in prestigious publications. OA journals and their authorfavoring agreements contrasted with the traditional copyright policies of
the commercial academic publishers and were a big reason that the OA
movement attracted backers.
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Commercial publishers have embraced OA by offering either some
author-approved content for free or the author-pays model option. Springer
saw the OA handwriting on the wall and decided to embrace the business
model that many critics said was not sustainable. In 2008 Springer acquired
BioMed Central’s 196 titles and since then it has kept the author-pays, freeaccessible model in place. Since Springer is a large for-profit large publisher
one can assume that the BioMed Central acquisition has been profitable, but
authors and researchers continue to have OA access to the publishers’ titles.
This acquisition by Springer may be partly responsible for giving OA the
“mainstream” stamp of approval.
OA has gained steady momentum over the last decade and several citation impact studies, conducted on a regular basis since 2000, indicate that,
in most disciplines, OA out-performed content available from publishers or
aggregators via paid subscriptions. Although some studies have examined
mitigating factors and concluded that findings favoring OA are faulty, most
studies do indicate that research published in OA titles were cited more than
proprietary content.
A 2004 paper examining OA and ISI’s Web of Science revealed: . . .
“that over 55% of the journals and over 65% of the articles indexed in Web
of Science in 2003 are produced by publishers who permit some form of selfarchiving, and so that these could be made OA by author archiving.” The
evolving environment of scholarly publishing includes additional avenues
for making content openly available.56
An in-depth citation study, published in 2010 in the Public Library of
Science (PLoS), reaffirmed what the same researchers had found in 2006,
that OA already has a significant positive impact on the availability of the
scientific journal literature. The results should be of general interest to scholars, but should also interest publishers, who need to take into account OA in
their business strategies and copyright policies, as well as research sponsors,
who like the National Institute of Health (NIH) are starting to require OA
availability of results from research projects they fund. Of articles published
in 2008, 8.5% were freely available at the publishers’ sites, and an additional 11.9% free manuscript versions could be found using search engines,
making the overall OA percentage 20.4%. Chemistry (13%) had the lowest
overall share of OA, Earth Sciences (33%) the highest. In medicine, biochemistry and chemistry, publishing in OA journals was more common. In
all other fields author-posted manuscript copies were dominant. The authors
concluded that: “In spite of the criticism and opposition and doubts about
its business model OA journals remain a viable option for scholarship.”57
OA and its freely available content have emerged as a timely alternative for both the researchers who use it and the authors who create
it, but it’s appropriate to mention here that most OA journals publishers,
unlike the commercial for-profits, do not ask for copyright transfer from the
authors, but rather arrange the transfer of some rights via a license. There are
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differences in these license agreements among various OA journal publishers
and some agreements cannot be distinguished from commercial copyright
transfer agreements in practice. Despite all the options, most long-time OA
advocates believe copyright should revert to the authors upon publication.58
Trade groups like the Association of American Publishers have criticized the OA business and rights model for creating a situation where the
peer review process is unduly influenced by federal and private money.
Some government agencies and private philanthropies require research that
they have sponsored to be freely accessible. These relationships, it has
been argued, between benefactors and recipients are a form of government
interference and a pose a threat to the traditional peer review process.
In reviewing the recent history of OA and the effort to legally
require that government-funded research be freely accessible, one finds that
Congress is divided between a pro-business, anti-regulation alliance and
those who believe that transparency and open government should trump
the commercial for-profit interests of publishers. Some government-funded
research is made available no longer than six months after it is published
but there are those who would like to see the content made available
immediately.

THE NIH GETS IT RIGHT
The NIH, to its credit, has had a policy, mandated by Congress in 2008,
which requires that all investigators funded by the NIH publish an “election version of their final peer-reviewed manuscript” in PubMed Central
within 12 months of the official date of publication. The NIH’s FAQ indicates
that this policy covers all manuscripts that are peer-reviewed, accepted for
publication, and funded by a direct NIH grant, cooperative agreement, or
contract.
Both the NIH policy and the 2009 Senate proposal, which requires a
6-month delay before publication of the public access version, have been
criticized by a number of publishing groups. These groups acknowledge
that maintaining their revenue streams for current and archived materials
is central to their position. However, they also argue that they add value
to the research through editing, enhanced readability, and secure and reliable archival access, to maintain the “continuity and sustainability” of the
information.59
The NIH policy is one of the most visible manifestations of the OA
movement in the United States. Proponents of OA see the movement as compatible with current copyright law, although some copyright holders argue
that it undermines the policy aims of copyright. Jonathan Miller compared
the Congressional debate in the 1960s on whether it was a good idea to
make educational research available in the public domain to the current one
on making government-funded scientific research accessible on the Internet.
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He asserted that there was initially strong resistance from educational organizations and publishers who argued that the policy of the forerunner of the
Department of Education, the U.S. Office of Education (USOE) would inhibit,
rather than encourage, publication. But the NIH policy exhibits a sensitivity
to copyright holders that the USOE did not consider, granting publishers or
authors a twelve month period of exclusivity before the published content
is publicly available. The historical context of the USOE policy on education
material, including curricular materials for K–12 as well as research material,
gained gradual momentum in the mid-sixties and included the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965.60
Neither the Bush nor the Obama administrations, nor their respective
Department of Education secretaries have been able to inspire and energize the country to support education legislation that would include making
taxpayer-funded research available without the six month embargo, as proposed in a current bill before Congress. Such bills have been undercut by the
political mantras of small government and economic self-sufficiency. Starting
with 1976’s Copyright Act, reinforced with CTEA by a succession of generally big business–friendly Congresses subscribe to the “trickle-down” school
of economics, the pervading political consciousness on this issue has been
unduly influenced by the lobbying of the copyright industry.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR LIBRARIES
Become Acquainted with RoMEO and SHERPA
Librarians who work at institutions with IRs are likely familiar with RoMEO
(Rights MEtadata for Open archiving) and SHERPA (Securing a Hybrid
Environment for Research Preservation and Access). But for librarians at
small and mid-sized schools where resources for IRs are not practical reality, these websites can still be used as tools to raise awareness regarding
alternatives to commercial publishing. Their copyright policies list those OA
titles that can be used as publishing alternatives for faculty committed to
the OA ideal. SHERPA provides a color-coded classification of publishers
according to their support of self archiving, that is, the deposit of electronic
versions of articles in institutional, disciplinary or interdisciplinary digital
repositories and/or the distribution of authors’ works from authors’ websites. The road involves journals that offer their contents on an open-access
basis. In both cases, article impact increases.61 Faculty members who want
to put their research articles online but are unclear about which funding
agencies require open access for archiving their research and which do
not—and which have requirements that fall somewhere in the middle—may
be referred to RoMEO. RoMEO includes a database of publisher policies
on the self-archiving of journal articles on the Web and in Open Access
repositories.62
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Consider a PPV Strategy
Since the bundled Big Deal is no longer sustainable at many academic
libraries where budgets are being cut, PPV is one of the options that should
be considered. Nicole Mitchell and Elizabeth Lorbeer found that canceling
the bundled Big Deal at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, was not
as difficult as they first imagined when it was first proposed as a moneysaving option. Their article, “Building Relevant and Sustainable Collections,”
one of several published in the last two years, outlines how a Web page
is useful to a library communicating with its users about making collection
decisions on a tight budget while also affording those users the opportunity
to provide feedback on journals important to them. The authors also investigated allocating 20% of the journal budget to cover PPV patron orders to
publishers. While fulfilling the need to supply content to users, this arrangement is a temporary solution to Alabama’s two-year funding decrease for
higher education. The librarians had devised another reduction in the number of journal subscriptions, but noted the provision of PPV would not be
as significant as canceling the bundles.63
Patrick Carr and Maria Collins’ “Acquiring Articles through Unmediated
User-Initiated Pay-Per-View Transactions: An Assessment of Current
Practices” is also recommended reading for those interested in learning
what institutions have implemented PPV and how the model has fared for
them.64

Behold! A Successful Model!
There are a number of resources where one can learn about the changing
nature of scholarship and viable, nascent alternatives to traditional publishing models, but for an informative, concise starting point, one can check
out “Reshaping Scholarly Communication” on a University of California
website (http://osc.universityofcalifornia.edu). This site reviews how other
business models have been successfully deployed and offers a concise table
that itemizes and details the feasibility of alternatives. There are links to
the site’s “News and Issues” page where visitors are urged to read up on
models that some commercial publishers, to their credit—namely Springer,
Oxford, National Academy of Sciences, and University Press—have followed.
Designed for UC faculty, the site actually can be accessed by anyone who
is frustrated by commercial publishing models and is looking for a place
to become more informed and to learn what action can be taken.65 Not all
universities, or even systems, have UC’s resources. But it can be hoped that
their e-Scholarship digital publishing repository of 30 UC titles that are all
OA will serve as inspiration to other schools. In addition to the repository, it
is interesting to note that UC scholars also receive discounts based on their
institution’s participation in the Public Library of Science (PLOS) and BioMed
Central.
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Manage Intellectual Property Differently
Encourage authors at your institution to use flexible copyrights with some
rights reserved, as advocated by Creative Commons. In particular, negotiate
with commercial publishers to retain the right to make a copy available in
one’s IR or own website.

Support Sustainable Scholarly Communication
Thoroughly examine all copyright agreements before signing and make
sure they do not unfairly favor the publisher by limiting access to the
author’s work. Also, refuse to serve on editorial boards of journals that have
unreasonable subscription fees.

CONCLUSION
The legislative and judicial record on copyright indicates that a business
environment that greatly favors large commercial copyright holders has been
in place since 1998. Trade groups like the MPAA, RIAA, and Association of
American Publishers have effectively used hyperbolic public rhetoric (i.e.,
“moral panics”), to protect existing markets and curtail innovation. Given
the strength of the copyright lobby and the U.S. Congress’ public record on
related legislation, it is unlikely that there will be copyright reform. In this
environment, innovation and change are likely to come slowly to the academic journal publishing industry. However, alternative approaches agreed
on by publishers and libraries, such as inexpensive (e.g., 99 cent), pay-perview downloads, and freely accessible content via the OA models, could
offer libraries relief from out-of-control serials budgets. What happened to
the major music labels in 2003 will happen to journal publishers whose
business models remain intractable and do not conform to the needs of
their customers. Just as users passed by MusicNet, Pressplay, and full album
CDs, libraries will abandon the bad business models that prevent them from
utilizing innovation and purchasing their content on a micro rather macro
level. There are a number of Web-based resources to help librarians and
the teaching faculty at their institutions to find publishing aternatives that
support OA and more progressive copyright agreements.
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